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ABSTRACT 
 
EMIILY PEARCE: Exporting Values: Conditionality, Democracy and the European 
Neighbourhood 
 
(Under the direction of: Milada Vachudova, John D. Stephens, Donald Searing) 
 
 
In recent years the European Union has begun to emerge as an important regional and 
global ‘soft’ power. The corner stone of its new role is the promotion of democracy and 
European values. In the past decade the borders of the EU have become increasingly 
unstable. In an attempt promote a stable and prosperous region the EU has developed the 
European Neighourhood Policy (ENP). However, an examination of the strategies and 
concepts present in this policy bring up questions surrounding its validity as a democracy 
promotion tool. In this thesis I will argue that the ENP will be insufficient as a democracy 
promotion tool because it fails to provide the necessary conditionality or reciprocity. I 
will argue that this lack of conditionality is a result of differing preferences among 
member states as well as EU economic and strategic protectionism. Finally, I will argue 
that without proper conditionality the ENP cannot succeed given the current political 
conditions in the ENP states. 
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I. Introduction 
 
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 redrew the map of Europe transforming 
a stretch of border that had divided it for nearly five decades. In the wake of this geo-
political transformation the European Union was faced with the task of creating policies 
that would address the host of newly democratizing nations emerging out of the former 
Soviet bloc. There was no question that a successful transition to market economy and 
democratic political systems for these new nations was in the best economic and security 
interests of the EU. But the importance of successful transition became ever clearer in 
1996 when the Balkan crises erupted and the EU found itself unable to prevent or contain 
the ethnic wars in Croatia and Bosnia. Together the Soviet collapse the Balkan wars led 
the EU to develop a stronger foreign policy throughout the 1990’s seeking to define a 
new role for itself as a regional and global power. To this end the EU opened the 
enlargement process to the central eastern European border countries and offered them 
the opportunity to join the EU if they successfully transitioned. The success of the 
enlargement process in soliciting reforms meant that the EU had found a valuable tool 
with which to exert geopolitical power and promote democracy beyond its borders. In 
furtherance of these objectives the accession process has been leveraged towards the 
Western Balkans in the aim of promoting democracy and stability in one of the EU’s 
most proximate and problematic regions. 
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With the 2004 enlargement complete the enlarged EU faces problems on its 
periphery that go beyond the Balkans. The enlargement pushed the borders of the EU 
towards the still unstable former soviet countries. On the outer rim of the EU 
neighbourhood the transition experience for these countries proved to be much more 
difficult than for their central European brethren. The struggling eastern European 
transition combined with an increasingly unstable Mediterranean region in the past 
decade has meant that the EU is facing volatile neighbours on all sides. In response to the 
pressure on its borders, proceeding from their new stronger foreign policy and the success 
of enlargement, the EU has formulated a policy meant to promote democracy and 
stability in the periphery. Christened the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) it seeks 
to use some of the mechanisms of Enlargement to support the goals of human rights, 
liberal democracy and “European value” promotion in the European neighbourhood. 
 
But even with the success of enlargement and its new position as a champion of 
democracy does the EU have the power to elicit reforms in its politically unstable 
periphery? Can the enlargement process serve as a framework for regional engagement 
but be as effective without the possibility of membership? Finally, will weak domestic 
political conditions serve to highlight the lack of strong conditionality? This paper will 
attempt to broach some of these questions but it is important to note the ENP is in its 
infancy. It will be several years until a thorough study on the impact of the ENP can be 
undertaken. I will, however, propose an introductory analysis of potential short falls of 
the ENP using similar past and existing agreements as starting points. 
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This thesis will argue that the ENP is likely to fail as a democracy promotion tool 
because it fails to provide a sufficiently strong and cohesive conditionality. In the first 
section I will examine the origins, mechanisms and goals of the ENP. In the second 
section I will look at regional challenges facing the EU. In the third section I will discuss 
the role of conditionality in democracy promotion and its function in the ENP. In the 
fourth and fifth sections I will discuss how the EU has undermined this conditionality 
through protectionism and internal division respectively. Finally, I will argue that weak 
conditionality will fail to solicit reforms in the ENP countries given their current 
domestic political conditions. 
 
II. The Purpose of the ENP: Exporting Stability, Economic Prosperity and 
Democracy 
 
The goals of the ENP are clear and deceptively simple: to encourage 
neighbourhood countries to make “European choices” with regards to values and 
standards. It was established to pursue “the Union’s desire for a neighbourhood populated 
by peaceful countries, which preferably share EU values.” (Johansson Nouges 2004:234) 
Proposed by Britain in 2003 the ENP was originally a policy initiative targeted at dealing 
with the Eastern European countries that, as of May 2004, would become neighbours of 
the EU. Initially known as the ‘wider Europe’ and the ‘proximity policy’ it was created as 
an extension of the existing regional and bilateral relationships. The European Union had 
established these relationships with neighbouring countries in the Mediterranean through 
the Barcelona Process in 1995 and Eastern Europe through the Partnership and Co-
operation Agreements (PCAs). The ENP sought to address problems with these existing 
agreements and bring them up to date with the current political climate. Most importantly 
 4 
this policy was created “with the objective of avoiding the emergence of new dividing 
lines between the enlarged EU and our neighbours and instead strengthening the 
prosperity, stability and security of all concerned.” (COM 2004/373) It seeks to do this, 
as the Commission Report on ‘Wider Europe’ specifies, by “tying the EU’s old and new 
neighbours closer to itself, while interconnecting the neighbourhood in terms of trade and 
political relations, energy, infrastructure, and telecommunication networks.” (Del Sarto 
and Schumacher 2005: 26) As such ENP countries are encouraged to conform to the 
standards and laws of the EU as set out in the acquis communautaire. This thrust towards 
the aquis aims to promote an institutional and value convergence towards EU norms on 
the far side of the border. Though the acquis is used as a basic framework for the ENP it 
is not an accession instrument and membership in the ENP does not precede or 
necessarily lead to accession talks. Former president of the European Commission 
Romano Prodi pointed out in 2002 speech on wider Europe, “We have to be prepared to 
offer more than partnership and less than membership, without precluding the later.” 
(Smith 2005: 763). 
 
The members of the ENP can be divided into two flanks: the eastern and southern. 
The latter consists of Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, the 
Palestinian Authority, Syria and Tunisia and the former Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. Each flank corresponds to a geographical area which 
borders the European Union. The original conception of an ENP designated for the 
Eastern European countries on the border of post-Enlargement Europe was renegotiated 
at the insistence of the southern European member states. Spearheaded by France, this 
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insistence led to the inclusion of the members of the Euro-Mediterranean partnerships in 
the Neighbourhood policy. This amendment to the policy signalled a regional priority 
divergence within the EU. Long standing regional relationships determined which border 
regions were most significant to which member states. These relationships are derived 
from immigration, trade and security, as well as the legacy of colonization in the case of 
the Mediterranean region. The problems bound up in these relationships were ‘on the 
back doorstep’ of geographically proximate countries. As a result” some of the members 
felt more interest in, and passion and capability for, issues close to their border than 
others. Thus, while Germany (and now the new member states) appeared to be more 
interested in Central and Eastern Europe, Spain, Italy, Greece and France were 
instrumental in introducing Mediterranean-related issues into the EU agenda.” (Aydin 
2005: 259) I will discuss this further in section VI. 
 
The ENP consists of bilateral Action Plans between states and the EU which “set 
out an agenda of political and economic reforms with short and medium-term priorities.” 
(COM 2004/373) These action plans are ‘tailor made’ to target specific issues facing the 
individual countries. They focus on concerns ranging from immigration to 
democratization, making the ENP a cross-pillar initiative. The “bewildering range of 
objectives [include] ensuring socioeconomic cohesion, resolving complex 
interdependencies expanding the area of freedom, security and justice, and promoting 
reform and common values in the EU immediate neighbourhood.” (Berg 2006: 56) The 
incentive for participation and implementation of these action plans is a stake in the 
internal market and with it the potential for greater freedom of movement of goods, 
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services, persons and capital. Further, EU aid is available to support implementation of 
action plans. Originally aid was allocated through TACIS for Eastern Europe and MEDA 
for the Mediterranean. However, in the 2007-2013 EU budget the ENP was allocated its 
own funding structure known as the European Neighbourhood and Partnership 
Instrument (ENPI) with a budget of € 12 billion, an increase of 32% from the previous 
period. (Europa2006) 
 
I have pointed to the fact that the ENP is a new tool in the EU’s foreign policy 
toolbox but the nature of the EU’s new stronger foreign policy has been influenced by the 
changing geopolitical landscape of the last 15 years. Taking shape in the 1990’s in the 
wake of the communist collapse, the Balkan crisis and U.S. hegemony the EU sought to 
assert itself as a stronger geopolitical actor on the world stage. The Balkan crisis was the 
first test of the international position of the EU in the post communist world. The Balkan 
wars had led to two significant foreign policy problems for the EU. One was that the EU 
had failed wield significant diplomatic or military power to avert the crises. Secondly, it 
illustrated the proximity of instability to European borders. In the late 1990’s and early 
2000 it was clear that the EU needed to formulate a strategy to deal with the rising crises 
on its borders. That strategy would also determine what type of power it would be. The 
nature of the Union with its weak CFSP and the power of the American military force 
meant that international security would not fall to the EU, least of all military security. 
Instead the EU sees itself as a ‘soft’ power exerting its influence on the global stage 
through the promotion of norms and values through engagement. (Kelley 2006: 
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39) To this end, from the early 1990s, “the EU has tried to systematically incorporate the 
promotion of a specific set of European values into its external relations.” (Borzel 
andRisse2007: 29) As a result one of the cornerstones of the ENP and of EU foreign 
policy in general is democracy promotion and the exporting of what are considered the 
‘European values’ of liberal democracy and human rights. 
 
Despite ambitious aims soft power is in many ways a limited power. In reality “as 
a truly global actor, the EU can only be a partial and incomplete power since its 
capacities are limited to the economic and, possibly, diplomatic arena”. (Dannreuther 
2004; 212) Instead it has been suggested that the EU be considered a regional power. 
(Missiroli 2004) And it is as an instrument of regional influence that the ENP can play a 
role in the EU’s foreign policy toolbox. The ENP is a form of external governance for 
advancing EU values and interests along its new periphery. It is a soft power tool which 
seeks to exert influence by exporting these ‘European values’ to unstable regions. The 
EU believes that economic prosperity will complement political liberalization and that by 
using the economy as a tool and democracy as a measuring stick the EU can help 
transform ‘unstable’ regions into prosperous ‘European style’ political nations. With this 
strategy in mind, the ENP seeks to provide incentives to spur reform. The EU attempted 
to exert its soft power regionally with two different initiatives in the 1990’s: the 
enlargement process and the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. The successes and failures 
of these agreements influenced the creation of the ENP and give insight into its future. I 
will discuss each of them turn. 
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The first and most significant exercise of the EU’s power beyond its borders was 
the fifth EU enlargement beginning in the early 1990’s. Following the Soviet collapse 
many of the CEE states sought to strengthen their ties with the EU with the goal of 
eventual membership. The EU began relations with these countries in the early 1990’s 
first on grounds of reconstruction. The EU provided technical and financial support to 
help the CEE countries rebuild their economies and governments. By 1993 six of the 
eight central European states had signed Association Agreements governing political and 
economic relations with the EU. In the same year the Copenhagen summit established 
that all European countries meeting a set of basic economic and political criteria would 
be eligible for EU membership. The eight Central European border countries, along with 
Malta and Cyprus, signed the first accession agreements in 1994 setting out ‘pre-
accession strategies’ with each applicant country. This process included the publication 
of annual reports on the countries progress in meeting EU laws and standards. With the 
prospect of membership to urge them on the ten countries undertook the massive reforms 
set out in the 80000 pages of acquis communautaires governing legal, political and 
economic regulation. In 1997the first negotiations were opened, followed by the others in 
1999. Then, in 2004, only fifteen short years after ousting communism all 10 candidate 
countries became EU members making it the largest enlargement in EU history. They 
were followed in 2007 by Bulgaria and Romania. 
 
What is important for our discussion is to what extent this process was driven by 
the substantial rewards of inclusion in the European Union, most notably the internal 
market, and the equally sizable costs of exclusion. Their pre-accession transformation 
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was substantial. Most of these countries deposed communism with the ultimate goal of 
liberal democracy even without EU influence but for the opportunity to become member 
countries transformed their entire political systems in a very short period. And during the 
difficult transition process many countries that were at risk of falling in to corrupt or semi 
authoritarian regimes were rescued by the prospect and pressures of membership. 
(Vachudova 2005) 
 
In parallel, the EU was meeting in Barcelona in November 1995 with the southern 
Mediterranean countries to create the Euro-Mediterranean partnership (EMP). Said to be 
one of the EU’s “most ambitious and innovative foreign policy initiatives” to date. 
(Youngs 2002: 77).The agreement aimed to strengthen the ties between the EU and the 
12 partner countries. The Barcelona declaration is an executive agreement comprised of a 
Declaration and a Work Programme. It sets out goals in three “baskets”: political stability 
and security, economic and financial cooperation, and cooperation on social cultural and 
humanitarian issues. (Borzel and Risse 2007). It comprises a set of general principles and 
common objectives in 40 or so sectors. The EMP is both multilateral and bilateral, 
prioritizing regional cooperation on the one hand and EU-EMP state partnerships on 
another. These bilateral partnerships took the form of Association and Cooperation 
Agreements signed by the Community with individual Mediterranean states and were 
later progressively upgraded to Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements (EMAA). 
At the time of the partnership the Middle East peace process was looking very optimistic. 
There was a feeling that the time was ripe for a rapprochement with the countries of the 
Maher and Machrek beyond member state bilateral relationships. The EMP was the EU’s 
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first attempt to exert its soft power without the accession carrot. The general consensus 
on the EMP at the ten year mark was that it had been a failure. The change in political 
environment in the Arab world in the decade after the initial signature of the agreement 
made many of the provisions unrealistic, most notably with regard to security and peace 
building. The situation was further exacerbated by the flare up of tensions in the Israeli- 
Palestinian conflict in 1997. As a result the focus of the EMP in the 21st century has been 
economic and financial cooperation. Today there are hopes that inclusion in the ENP will 
reinvigorate the political and humanitarian dimension of Euro-Mediterranean relations. 
 
III. Preventing New Dividing Lines in Europe: Challenges rising on the borders 
 
As mentioned above the ENP is meant to help prevent the emergence of dividing 
lines in Europe. Unfortunately, borders, like that created by the 2004 enlargement, 
necessarily create dividing lines and in the case of Europe this has meant the creation of 
‘in’ and ‘out’ groups. These groups have been defined as both a division between haves 
and have-nots and a division between regime types. James Rupnick writes that “a new 
map of the continent has been in the making since 1989, the contours of which remain 
uncertain. The new dividing lines are drawn not by imperial or great-power ambitions but 
by a differentiation process among post-communist transitions.”(Rupnik, 2000: 128). The 
‘in’ group consists of the central European countries that were able to make the 
demanding reforms and are now EU members, while the ‘out group’ is represented by the 
Eastern European and Mediterranean countries that make up a volatile periphery. 
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To understand why the EU should be concerned about the creation of these lines 
we must understand the challenges of regional instability, immigration and security the 
EU has come to face in recent years. Concerns have arisen that those on the ‘outside’ of 
the European Union will become further destabilized as a result of feelings of exclusion. 
Experience has shown that this periphery is becoming increasingly volatile. The past two 
decades of Mediterranean of political instability has characterized by the politicization of 
Islam with the rise of fundamentalist Islamic elements in several countries. The majority 
of the governments consist of consolidated authoritarian regimes, some of which have 
been in power for several decades. A civil war in Algeria beginning in 1993 saw a violent 
Islamic insurgence. All the Mediterranean ENP countries but Egypt and Morocco fall at 
5.5 on the freedom house scale.1 
 
Eastern Europe has not been fairing much better. Of the five countries in the 
eastern flank of the ENP all but Moldova fall below 90 on the corruption scale, 
(TransparencyInternational2006) and all but Ukraine fall below 100 on both the 
democracy and freedom of press scale (World Audit 2007). The recent elections in 
Belarus, whose ENP membership was suspended, demonstrate the still strong presence of 
the former communist authoritarian system. Conflicts in Abkazia, South Ossetia, Ngorno 
–Karabkh and Transniestria continue despite political reforms in several of the countries 
concerned. What is more, the transition to a liberal market economy and the process of 
privatization proved extremely difficult for the countries in the ‘outer ring’ of transition. 
It is in the context of “the enlarged Union’s even greater exposure to a decidedly less 
                                                 
1
 The Freedom Index combines the ratings for “civil liberties” and “political rights” and ranges from 1 
(best) to 7 (worst). See <http://www.freedomhouse.org>. 
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predictable and less peaceful set of states on its external borders in eastern Europe and in 
the Mediterranean. The remedy to this situation, as the document claims, is to promote 
‘an arc of well-governed states in [the EU’s] neighbourhood’.”(Johansson-Nogues 2004: 
242) 
 
Immigration continues to be one of the most contentious issues with regards to 
Europe. In the southern European countries 17.0% of all non-EU nationals in the EU 
come from the southern Mediterranean, between 6 and 13 million people from Maghreb 
(or their decedents) possess some form of citizenship in the European Union (Leveau 
2002). Immigration is also an issue to the east. Roughly 15.0% of all immigration to the 
accession countries in the period leading up to accession was from the eastern 
neighbourhood countries. As of 2004 more than 20% of the active labour force of 
Moldova had left the country in search of better opportunities most of which they hoped 
to find in Romania that was soon to become a member state (Berge2006, 64). Further, 
there were and estimated 3 million illegal immigrants in the EU in 2004, many of them 
originating form ENP countries. Along with issues of migration, both legal and illegal, 
come concerns of human and drug trafficking. Both the southern and eastern border of 
the EU have been trying to cope with increased cross border trafficking of women and 
children for sexual exploitation, drugs and arms dealing and organized crime. 
 
In the past decade security has also been an increasing concern for the EU. On the 
one hand Russia seems to be in the business of reconsolidating the post-soviet space. 
Russian democratic reforms have been hindered by a difficult privatization process and 
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rampant corruption. What is more, Russia considers the Eastern countries of the ENP its 
‘near abroad’ and sees the EU’s presence in Eastern Europe as a threat to its regional 
dominance. (Noutchevaand Emerson 2006) It has so far shown no reluctance to interfere 
in the political developments and regional conflicts of its former Union, leading the EU 
to temper its strategies for regional influence in an attempt to assure stable relations with 
Russia. Even more recent developments in the Russian political climate and the future 
position of current president Vladimir Putin indicate that the EU will have to continue to 
pay close attention to development in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus. 
 
Political concerns over Russian dominance are complicated by the fact that the 
EU is heavily dependent on Russian oil and gas. As such the situation in the Caucasus 
specifically is a primary concern of the EU to ensure safe, reliable access to these 
resources. In fact, both regions are strategically important as far as energy security is 
concerned. Several of the southern countries are rich in oil resources. The eastern 
countries serve as a gateway to Russia vast oil supplies which puts them in them middle 
of a dangerous vying for regional dominance. Many of the ENP countries are transit 
countries through which major pipelines run. The EU is dependent on them for oil and 
gas, 66% and 31% of gas supplies from the former Soviet Union and North Africa 
respectively. And, as the 2006 Ukrainian oil crisis illustrated, EU cannot afford disruptive 
instability in the area. 
 
On the southern border oil has recently taken a back seat to concerns over a surge 
in terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism. Since the Iraq war tensions and anti-western 
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sentiments in Muslim countries have increased. The London and Madrid bombings 
demonstrated that the EU is not immune to the effects of these tensions. In collaboration 
with the US the EU seeks to tighten border controls and promote western sympathetic 
governments who will curb Islamic extremism. In theory this includes the promotion of 
strong liberal democracies which are seen as a way to moderate these threats by creating 
governments allied with the west. In practice this has proven to be complex, as I will 
discuss in Section V. 
 
In this neighbourhood of mounting hostility and instability the ENP has become 
an increasingly important policy. The success of the policy could ensure a secure 
neighbourhood for the EU. Close cooperation with strong, consolidated democracies 
would mean the putting in place of programs to curb illegal migration and organized 
crime, assure consistent access to resources and coordination on issues of national 
security. If these are the reasons for and goals of the ENP than the success now lies in the 
strategies. 
 
IV. Conditionality and the ENP 
 
In this section I will discuss the mechanism of conditionality. I will then explore 
three reasons why the conditionality in the ENP process is likely to produce little 
compliance: (1) The absence of membership as a reward; (2) The absence of full 
participation in the internal markets a reward; (3) The absence of a clear merit based 
system of reward for compliance. Much of the EU’s geopolitical influence is based on the 
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principle of conditionality. This tool, based on a combination of “sticks” and “carrots”, 
was used to encourage the reform process in the ten accession countries. As a result of 
the successful transition made by these states to market economy and liberal democracies 
this strategy was taken up in the ENP. The enlargement process’ success in the diffusion 
of values is attributed to the use of active and passive leverage. What Milada Vachudova 
calls passive leverage is “the traction the EU has on the domestic politics of credible 
candidate states merely by virtue of its existence and its usual conduct.”(Vachudova 
2006: 4) She defines active leverage as “the deliberate policies of the EU toward 
candidate states (or in this case ENP member states). [It] is animated by the fact that the 
tremendous benefits of EU membership create incentives for states to satisfy the 
enormous entry requirements” (ibid) were the cornerstones of accession policy and are 
considered the most effective strategies in the promotion of reform. 
 
The EU has now chosen to use political conditionality as its instrument to foster 
change in the neighbourhood. According to Kelley the EU neighbourhood strategy was 
modeled on the accession criteria from the 2004 enlargement. She argues that “the path 
dependency of the ENP is strong. Its raison d’etre is enlargement… The ENP is also an 
extension and adaptation of the Commission’s active foreign policy role during 
enlargement.” (Kelley 2006: 31) And so the ENP Action Plans are based on 
conditionality where by “relations with neighbours will be upgraded only as progress is 
demonstrated on issues related to democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of 
law” (Johansson Nogues 2004: 245). The “sticks” or penalties for not conforming to 
goals set out in the action plans are simply exclusion from the benefits provided by a 
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bilateral relationship with the EU. The “carrots” or rewards include increased trade, aid 
and European logistical and technical support and Foreign Direct Investment with the 
ultimate carrot of possible access to the EU internal market. The ENP was created as an 
intermediate alternative to accession but it is also meant to be used as leverage in the 
same way that accession was used for the Central European Eight. Prodi suggests, the 
ENP is meant to “offer everything but the institutions in returns for tangible reforms”. 
(Smith 2005: 763) The question is whether the ENP can act as positive leverage for 
Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean in the same way accession did for central Europe? 
Will they have the necessary teeth to spur reforms? 
 
In an examination of the conditionality strategy in the ENP one obvious element 
is lacking: the possibility of accession. The central European reforms were driven for the 
most part by the promise of accession to the EU. But as Romano Prodi pointed out in the 
speech quoted above that is not the case in the ENP. One obvious reason for the non-
accession dimension of the ENP is the ‘enlargement fatigue’ which has described the 
period following the 2004, and later2007, accessions. But while all countries, both in the 
EU and the ENP, recognize that further accessions in the near future are unlikely there is 
some question to the extent to which the ENP serves to preclude the possibility of 
accession for the countries which are members. Many in the ENP countries feel that the 
ENP is a ‘second class’ agreement meant to placate them and exclude them from possible 
accession. They believe the policy undermines the basic agreement that 
European country which meets the Copenhagen criteria is eligible for accession. This 
sentiment among ENP members has been one of the main shortfalls of the policy. This 
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sentiment has been strongest amongst Eastern European countries who are the most likely 
to be considered for eventual membership. On a rhetorical level the EU is careful to point 
out that membership in the ENP does not preclude the possibility of accession but 
experience suggests that no such possibility as yet truly exists for Eastern European 
countries. As I mentioned in my discussion of the accession process it was the ultimate 
carrot of accession that drove the candidate countries to pursue difficult reforms. It is thus 
unlikely that any benefit short of membership will have the strength to elicit the kind of 
compliance that we saw in the EU enlargement process. 
 
A second weakness of the ENP is the absence of full access to the EU market. As 
discussed above access to the EU internal market is one alternative to accession on offer 
to the ENP countries. However, despite advances in several countries in the realm of 
legislative reform, for example Morocco and Ukraine, the full implementation of market 
access has been slow incoming. Originally the Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with the 
countries of the Southern Mediterranean implied the phasing in of the services sector 
along side the goods sector. But as of now full access to the market, even with regards to 
goods, has not been realized. On the contrary, “EU Member States, in particular southern 
European countries that have large agricultural production capacities and important 
immigrant communities from the Mediterranean, [are] sensitive to a full-fledged 
implementation of the four freedoms.” (Del Sarto and Schumacher 2005; 32) This is 
because there continue to be sensitive sectors which the EU seeks to protect from external 
access. These include agriculture, textiles, chemicals and steel, products which make up a 
major part of the export economy of these countries. Currently this is even more 
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significant for Eastern Europe as greater tariff restrictions are currently in place on 
industrial goods from the East. (Vachudova 2006; 45) A stake in the internal market 
which allowed for complete or near complete participation could serve as a powerful 
incentive for compliance. However, as it stands today, the rewards are vague and not very 
impressive. 
 
Conditionality is further weakened by a lack of follow through. If the alternative 
incentives are to be effective they must be complemented with a clear ‘tit for tat’. This is 
lacking first on a structural level. The ENP indicates that the completion of action plans 
will lead to a stake in the internal market but "the benefits on offer from the ENP are only 
vaguely summarized at the start of the action plans, and they are not directly connected to 
fulfillment of the huge number of objectives or even the most important priorities." 
(Smith 2005: 764) Yet, the ENP does not set out practical guidelines for implementation 
and it is unclear how progress should be judged. No deadline or benchmarks exist for the 
fulfillment of goals in specific areas as well as no specific monitoring mechanisms (Ibid). 
Reciprocity is also lacking on the implementation level. The predecessor to the ENP in 
the Mediterranean, the EMP, distributed the most significant amount of EU aid but 
represented simultaneously the most ‘significant deviation from rewards-based 
conditionality.’ The current situation points to a similar trend in the ENP. With the EMP 
“the Mediterranean states that had implemented the most far-reaching political 
liberalization increasingly expressed their frustration that they had not been rewarded for 
doing so,” (Youngs 2004: 9) the ENP risks engendering similar frustration. If 
conditionality is inconsistent and promises are often unrealized “the absence of a clear 
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political discrimination between the potential partners, which would distinctively award 
the less autocratic neighbouring countries in comparison with the more autocratic ones, 
[it] is bound to be ineffective.”(Schemmelfennig 2005: 8) Without a clear meritocratic 
system that determines what reforms are priorities and how those reforms will be 
rewarded it is difficult to expect ENP countries to expend a great deal of time, energy or 
expense. (Vachudova 2006). 
 
V. ENP Short Falls: EU Protectionism and Self-Interest 
 
Above I have discussed how a clear meritocratic system could strengthen the 
validity of the ENP. In this section I will illustrate how EU protectionism has served to 
undermine the creation of such a system. Agreements like the ENP are asymmetrical in 
nature and there is no question that the EU holds most of the cards. The asymmetric 
nature of these relationships allows the EU to protect their own interest and while lip 
service has been paid to democracy promotion these interests have been overwhelmingly 
of a security and economic nature. Protectionism by the EU or individual member states 
on economic and security grounds threatens to undermine the legitimacy of ENP. Trade 
relations illustrate a high degree of economic protectionism with the clearest example 
being supposed market access for countries meeting reform criteria. Regional trade and 
integration is a recognized objective of the EU’s Mediterranean policy, “not least because 
of the positive effects on regional political and economic stability that will result from the 
creation of a larger Mediterranean market.” (COM (2003) 104 Final) Despite these 
predictions trade relationships continue to be one-sided with the EU limiting market 
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access in sectors they consider to be under threat. But the ENP countries have little 
leverage to increase their demands for market access. One of the legacies of colonial 
trade, as well as the general weakness of many of the Mediterranean economies, is a 
heavily asymmetric trade relationship between the EU and its neighbours with 
Mediterranean countries dependent on European imports and exports. 
 
This is even truer of Eastern Europe. While the Mediterranean countries do have 
reserves of oil and industrial production to offer, from the perspective of the EU the 
eastern economies are tiny and their importance to EU trade is negligible. Conversely, the 
tiny economies of Eastern Europe are desperate to participate in EU trade. Even in areas 
where the ENP countries could have significant cards to play, for example energy 
security, they find themselves with little leverage in negotiations. Their weak economies 
mean that they cannot afford disruptions in much needed income coming from oil 
supplies. The transit states must compete against each other to secure pipelines and they 
do not “have the capacity to stave off short-term social costs of curbing national energy 
subsidies,” (Lavanex and Stulberg 2006; 23) leaving them vulnerable at the bargaining 
table. 
 
As discussed in our examination of conditionality the EU continues to be heavily 
restrictive in sensitive sectors. Conversely promotion of economic self interest is also 
evident in the willingness of the EU to slacken democratic demands in exchange for 
economic advantages.” In the Mediterranean countries…economic cooperation has been 
quite high in spite of questionable political systems and human rights conditions.”(Kelley 
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2006; 45) This is most notable in the case of Libya, where EU trade volume reached over 
12 billion Euros in 2002, fifth among the Mediterranean neighbours, despite extensive 
abuses of power. (Del Sarto 2005; 33)From this stems criticism that the many member 
countries choose to push the normative agenda only when it is in their best interest. For 
example, “at Barcelona southern EU states reportedly expressed a willingness to exclude 
references to democracy and agreed to insist on such a commitment only after northern 
states sanctioned new aid funding for the region.” (Youngs2002; 44) Member states fear 
that strict conditionality will upset important bilateral economic relationships with 
undemocratic regimes. But such behavior calls into question the EU’s genuine 
commitment to its own policies and more importantly to feeling that reforms maybe not 
be worth pursuing without guaranteed rewards.  
 
Slackened democratic demands have also played a role in the promotion of 
strategic and security interests of the EU. In recent years this has been an important 
discussion with regards to the Mediterranean. The war on terror has meant that the rise of 
Islamic extremist elements in the Mediterranean region have trumped democracy 
promotion as an area of concern. In countries where popular tendencies have tended to 
support Islamic groups, countries like Tunisia, Egypt and Algeria, the EU has tended to 
support western sympathetic groups at the expense of rule of law and free and fair 
elections. In many cases “governments in the region [use] the ‘war on terror’ as an excuse 
to impose ever tighter controls and restrictions on their citizens, citing fear of terrorism as 
a justification.” (Amirah-Fernandez and Youngs 2006: 85) The EU’s tendency to look the 
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other way in these situations or put weak and cursory pressure on these governments 
demonstrates a clash between security interests and value promotion. 
 
There is one area where conflicts around security and economic priorities 
converge: energy security. Recent developments in the bilateral relationships between 
Russia and member states concerning energy policy have engendered fears that the EU 
will defend its own economic interests at the cost of promoting stability in the eastern 
neighbourhood. Protection of access to Russia’s vast oil supplies is only one side of the 
coin. On the other side lie apprehensions about Russia as a possible security threat. The 
former hegemon seems to be seeking to reconsolidate its power and flare ups in the 
border regions with Georgia and Moldova show that Russia is not reluctant to interject 
itself into these conflicts. By pursuing as stable relationship with Russia the EU seeks 
both protect its access to energy supplies and maintain an open security dialogue with a 
former enemy. 
 
While the EU may benefit from a strong relationship with Russia the message to 
the former Soviet ENP members is mixed. For many committing to the ENP is an 
opportunity to free themselves from Russian influence. They hope that by illustrating this 
commitment they will receive support from the EU in their efforts to reform. However, 
given that “the EU defined its promotion of democratization processes and human rights 
… to be of the highest importance…Why has the EU been marginalizing Russia’s 
support of semi-democratic regimes in Eastern Europe?” (Duleba 2006: 11) Certain 
Russia-Member state relationships give eastern neighbours pause to consider rhetorical 
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condemnation of Russia’s undemocratic practices and urging for the EU to sever ties with 
Russia and make ‘European’ choices. For example, the appointment of former German 
Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder as chairman of a pipe-line building subsidiary of natural 
gas giant Gazprom in 2005.(BBC, 2006) All the while comments like that of former 
French president Valery Giscard d’Estaing that “Russia without Ukraine is as ridiculous 
as France without the Rhone-Alps region” make it difficult for eastern neighbours to 
decide where allegiances should lie.(Kuzio, 2006 :94) Not all member states share the 
same opinion on how relations with Russia should develop. Many of the new member 
states in particular support viewing Russia as a security threat and would prefer to 
distance EU-Russian relations. 
 
VI. An Inconsistent ENP: EU Internal Division 
 
I have suggested above that a more consistent and reciprocal ENP could compel 
some neighbouring states to pursue political and economic reform. However, this is 
unlikely given the absence of a substantial reward together with unreliable application of 
the ENP. Why? Why has the EU been unable to craft and ENP with more bite? In this 
section I argue that internal divisions within the EU have produced a weak ENP. In the 
EU nearly every issue has advocates and opponents, with fault lines lying where priorities 
diverge. According to Sedelmeier these division fall along two lines. First the macro 
policy makers, usually meaning representatives of the member states, are considered with 
the overall appearance and aims and instruments of the policy. Second the sectoral policy 
makers in charge of more specialized policy domains are concerned with subsections of 
 24 
over-arching policy (Sedelmeier 2006: 82) So while member states battle it out amongst 
each other to determine which interests will dominate the policy formation process 
another division is taking place on a vertical level. Here “preferences of macro- and 
sectoral policy-makers might diverge due to their different organisational positions that 
imply different goal hierarchies.” (Ibid) This serves to undermine the creation of the 
composite and cohesive policy. 
 
One major point of divergence has been how to best handle both emerging and 
existing border relationships with the neighbourhood. In the debate of ‘hard’ versus ‘soft’ 
borders member states advocate ‘soft’ borders with the countries that they neighbour, and 
‘hard’ borders with countries that are removed from them. “The EU’s north-south 
division was paralleled by differences between the regional Mediterranean and Common 
Foreign and Security Policymaking communities within the EU, the former urging 
flexibility, the latter concerned more with the overall consistency of European 
strategy.”(Youngs 2002: 44) Issues of illegal migration and drug and human trafficking 
are major concerns for the EU as a whole. But these concerns are present on both borders 
and the proximate effects of these security concerns and relevant policies involve first the 
member states that make up the respective borders. There have been divisions 
surrounding the implementation of ‘hard’ policies where “stretches of the external border 
are laden with specific meanings, collective memories and particular histories of relations 
and interaction.” (Berg 2006: 60). 
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The new member states, the ones that currently make up the 5000 km of border to 
the east, have a greater interest in maintaining regional relationships. On the opposing 
side, southern European countries wish to maintain flexible relationships with 
Mediterranean countries. Each group wishes to maintain flexible economic ties with 
neighbouring countries with which they have long standing political and economic 
relationships. Berg points to a “divergent assessment of opportunities and threats” 
coming from wider Europe. Berg refers to these conflicting interests as an “ongoing 
vacillation between economic and security imperatives and between incentives for greater 
openness and control.” (Berg 2006: 57). As such, “the degree of openness is not uniform 
along the entire external border but depends heavily on specific historical, political and 
institutional contexts.” (Ibid 62) For the ‘new’ member states the countries of the Eastern 
flank are long standing neighbours struggling with transitions similar to the ones they 
have just experienced. For Southern European countries large Diasporas from the 
countries of Maghreb and in some cases, as with Spain and Morocco, a significant 
presence of their own citizens within their neighbours’ borders, make stable and flexible 
border policy to the south a priority. Despite a consensus within the European Union that 
all would benefit from a stable and prosperous neighbourhood both to the east and to the 
south there are internal divisions about where resources and policy should be focused. 
 
But how does this affect the EU’s perceived leverage? Visa regimes and technical 
support on border security make up a significant part of the EU’s relationship with its 
neighbours as well as significant amount of financial and technical assistance. 
Cooperation on these issues is seen as an act of good faith on both sides of the borders. 
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The ENP states are aware of the security and immigration concerns that define the border 
relationships with the EU by pledging to support related initiatives and making necessary 
reforms they are hoping to strengthen relations. However, when internal debates arise 
many neighbours fear that EU commitments to a soft border will not be honoured as part 
of the conditionality agreements. Without this firm incentive their commitment to 
cooperate may wane. 
 
For the Eastern neighbours there is a further, more fundamental, factor in the 
make up of the ENP that undermines the EU’s promises. The competing regional 
interests of the EU member states influenced the initial make up of the ENP. As 
discussed above, it was targeted only to the countries bordering the EU to the East, but 
after insistence from southern member states was extended to include countries from 
North Africa and the Middle East. The southern EU countries considered these regions to 
be more relevant to their particular trade and security interests. But today, many Eastern 
Neighbours are frustrated about sharing an agreement with countries which are not 
‘European’ in a cultural sense, but are also precluded from accession. Sharing an 
agreement is perceived as unfair owing to the fact that domestic conditions in the 
Mediterranean differ significantly from those of Eastern Europe and the political and 
security context to the south is at the very least more complex. This points to a lack of 
support by the EU’s eastern neighbours which serves to further undermine leverage in the 
region. To add insult to injury, the break down of aid distribution reflect how regional 
divisions lead to vying for EU attention and interest. Currently, roughly 70% of ENP 
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funding goes to the southern flank countries despite the weaker economic position of the 
Eastern flank (Kempe 2007: 3). 
 
VII. Considering Domestic Conditions: Insufficient Institutional and Social Capital 
 
I have so far discussed the over arching problems of conditionality in the 
effectiveness of the ENP for promoting democratic reforms. I have discussed that even in 
the absence of membership it may be possible for the EU to exercise leverage using 
alternative incentives. In this section I will discuss how domestic factors stand in the way 
an effective ENP. The political systems in the ENP countries, both to the south and the 
east, have developed in a way that leaves them lacking many of the necessary conditions 
for ‘western style’ liberal democracies. Thomas Carothers argues that post- authoritarian 
regimes require certain preconditions to develop into democracies, “that various 
structural conditions clearly weigh heavily in shaping political outcomes” (Carothers 
2003; 16). The domestic environments in many ENP countries fail to meet these 
conditions. They are lacking both institutional capacity and socialization. Economically 
many of the states of the ENP do not have a 'favourable regulatory environment' to 
sustain a modern economy. (Ibid, 37) In 2004 all but Jordan and Armenia fell below 0.0 
on the World Bank Regulatory Quality Index. The average score for Middle East and 
North Africa was -0.5and the former Soviet Union averaged -1.0. Carothers suggests that 
“relative economic wealth” is one of the preconditions for democracy. Not only do these 
countries have weak economies, with average GDP at $1,300 US in the WNIS and 
$3,649US in the Mediterranean for 2003, but without a strong regulatory environment 
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they lack the capacity and institutional structures necessary to promote private sector 
development. 
 
Moreover, they all lack any substantial “past experience with political pluralism”. 
None of the former soviet countries had any experience with democracy until after 1991. 
In the Mediterranean the post colonial experience with democracy is patchy and marked 
by consolidated authoritarian regimes and frequent overthrows of government. These 
countries do not fair much better in rule of law. For rule of law all but Israel, Tunisia and 
Jordan fall bellow zero, with the former Soviet Union average falling just bellow -1.0. 
Without rule of law, independent judiciaries, and needed economic and political 
regulatory systems to assure transparency there is no system of checks in place to 
moderate corruption or encourage reform. 
 
The lack of proper domestic conditions is also an important factor when accessing 
the use of the accession process as a framework for the ENP. As Kelley points out, the 
ENP countries are not currently in the same position as accession countries were when 
implementing criteria. At the beginning of the accession process in 1993 the average 
polity/democracy score for the ten was 8.36 (on a scale of -10/+10) where as in 2003 the 
average score for the ENP countries was -1.0. “The whole process of EU accession pre-
supposes states that are coherent and effective enough to spend years pursuing the 
complex political and administrative project of integration.” (Mingui-Pippidi 2004: 55) 
This begs the question of whether accession is an appropriate model for the ENP or 
whether or not a new framework needs to be created to accommodate the differences 
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between the ENP countries and the accession countries. “Beyond offering the countries 
of wider Europe the essential incentive of accession, policies are needed to bring them to 
the level where the Central European countries were prior to starting their European 
accession… the adoption and internalization of EU legislation [can only succeed] after 
countries have largely completed successful transitions, [and] cannot substitute for 
development and state-building policies where transitions are far from accomplished.” 
(Mungui-Pippidi 2004: 51) It may prove that despite successes in the accession countries 
the acquis communautaire is not an appropriate framework for countries struggling with 
basic economic reforms. (Smith 2005) More relevant to our discussion is the argument 
that institution building and market economies as part of the pre-conditions for successful 
transition were facilitated and promoted in Central Europe by the possibility of accession. 
If this is the case then, on top of lacking similar starting points, the ENP countries do not 
have the same powerful incentive to drive reform. 
 
Beyond formal capacity, countries face problems with socialization, most notably 
concerning elite behaviours. The EU used exposure to “socialization to promote domestic 
debate and elite learning aimed at changing the norms and values of the societies entering 
the EU.” (Vachudova 2006: 48) However, in countries that do not as yet have the 
necessary institutional capital to moderate elite behaviour, as discussed above, benefits 
for individual leaders of shirking EU values far outweighs whatever benefits may be 
available for the country as a whole. Many of the reforms demanded by the ENP 
necessarily threaten the position of elites because they involve increased political 
competition and transparency. This amounts to what Schemmelfennig terms “high 
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domestic adaptation costs”. The lack of viable candidature further limits the EU’s 
leverage when states with the farthest to go in terms of democratic reforms tend to pay 
the highest price. In these countries “the potential benefits of compliance with EU 
conditions were so much smaller than the costs of adaptation. In the absence of a 
membership perspective, EU incentives could not match the political power costs the 
incumbent regimes would have incurred had they complied with EU democracy and 
human rights conditions.” (Schemmelfennig 2005; 8) This stems from the fact that EU 
demands with regard to reform tend to threaten the position of rent-seeking elites who, by 
implementing the necessary policy reforms, would undermine their own sources of 
illegitimate power. (Smith 2005) The EU must provide powerful incentives to offset high 
costs. 
 
Socialization is not just a problem on the elite level. The lack of democratic 
experience in these countries means that domestic groups normally involved in the 
functioning of a western style democracy lack the necessary knowledge to influence the 
democratic process. It is in this context that civil society groups and political parities are 
also in the process of discovering their potential roles and capacities in liberal 
democracies. Natalie Tocci argues that a convergence in domestic conditions depends on 
a 'goodness of fit' between EU standards and domestic conditions. According to Tocci 
convergence is unlikely in states where there is an absence of domestic political groups 
supporting EU goals. The EU can have a positive impact when such groups, if present, 
use EU conditionality as a tool to further and legitimize their agenda. By providing 
benchmarks with which domestic actors in nascent democracies can pressure for reforms 
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EU standards and serve to “change to domestic political configuration” (Tocci 2004; 14) 
But in order to be effective the EU must provide these groups with a coherent and strong 
conditionality. 
 
VIII. Conclusion 
 
In this thesis I have argued that the ENP is a weak democracy promotion tool. To 
this end I have explained the specific factors that have enfeebled the ENP: The primary 
factor is the weakness of conditionality through the lack of membership and the lack of 
clear and substantial internal market participation; second, a lack of clear merit based 
rewards for reforms, and finally, the weak domestic political conditions in the ENP states. 
I have also examined why the EU has produced such a weak policy. Internal division and 
protectionism within the EU have made the creation of a cohesive policy difficult.  
 
The ENP is now in its infancy. The first action plans were signed in 2004 and 
have yet to undergo assessment. We can be sure, however, that results have been mixed. 
Countries like Morocco, Ukraine and Georgia have come a long way in the past years and 
have shown a clear commitment to the ENP and democratic values. None the less, their 
reforms are far from consolidated. The progress they have made is tenuous and does not 
necessarily indicate a similar future for the other ENP countries. On the contrary, for 
every success story there is a country where the ENP was an insufficient instrument. The 
authoritarian systems of Belarus, Syria and Libya have become further entrenched in the 
years since the ENP. That is not to say that they ENP is responsible for the emergence of 
 32 
these regimes just as the ENP is not wholly responsible for the changes in the countries 
that have undergone reform. However, with democracy promotion as a priority for the 
ENP the recent political histories of its countries have not been encouraging. 
 
General consensus on the effectiveness of the European Neighbourhood Policy 
(and its predecessors) in influencing reform in the region is that it has failed. “Studies of 
EU democracy promotion beyond candidates for membership generally come to the 
conclusion that EU policy has been inconsistent, fragmented and often undermined by 
strategic or economic goals.”(Schemmelfennig 2005: 5). Schemmelfennig illustrates that 
the increase in democracy and political liberalism in the countries of the ENP since 
beginning their relationships with the EU a decade ago is marginal. On the whole the 
Freedom House indexes on ‘civil liberties’ and ‘political rights’ have seen only a 
variation of +/- 0.5% since the signing of the relevant partnership agreements of each 
country with the EU, with a maximum loss of -2.5% for Belarus. While this is 
discouraging the ENP does lay the foundation for a policy that could exert real influence 
over the democratic development of the EU neighbourhood. The future success of the 
ENP now lies in the EU commitment to a coherent, comprehensive, uniform, and most 
importantly reciprocal policy. 
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D. Kauffman, A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi. 2005: Governance Matters IV: Governance 
Indicator for 1996 -2004. (Taken from Sedelmeier, Ulrich. 2006. “The European 
Neighbourhood Policy: a comment on theory and policy.” In Weber, Smith and Baun) 
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Neighbourhood Policy: a comment on theory and policy.” In Weber, Smith and Baun) 
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APPENDIX III 
 
 
 
Freedom House Data for ENP Countries 
 
 
 
FI1 
1992/ 
95 
Agreement 
signed FI2 
D1  
(FI1-
FI2) 
Agreement 
In force FI3 
D2  
(FI2-
FI3) 
FI4 
2004 
D3  
(FI3-
FI4) 
D  
(FI1-
FI4) 
Belarus 3.5 1995 5 -1.5    6  -2.5 
Moldova 5 1994 4 1 1998 3 1 3.5 -0.5 1.5 
Russia 3.5 1994 3.5 0 1997 3.5 0 5.5 -2 -2 
Ukraine 3 1994 3.5 -0.5 1998 3.5 0 3.5 0 -0.5 
Armenia 3.5 1996 4.5 -1 1999 4 0.5 4.5 -0.5 -1 
Azerbaijan 5 1996 5.5 -0.5 1999 5 0.5 5.5 -0.5 -0.5 
Georgia 4.5 1996 4 0.5 1999 3.5 0.5 4 -0.5 0.5 
Algeria 6 2002 5.5 0.5    5.5  0.5 
Egypt 6 2001 6 0 2004 5.5 0.5 5.5 0 0.5 
Israel 2 1995 2 0 2000 2 0 2 0 0 
Jordan 4 1997 4 0 2002 5.5 -1.5 4.5 1 -0.5 
Lebanon 5.5 2002 5.5 0 2003 5.5 0 5.5 0 0 
Libya 7       7  0 
Morocco 5 1996 5 0 2000 5 0 4.5 0.5 0.5 
PA  1997   1997   5.5   
Syria 7 2004 7 0    7  0 
Tunisia 5.5 1995 5.5 0 1998 5.5 0 5.5 0 0 
Average 4.75  4.7 -0.1  4.29 0.13 5 (4.5) -0.2 -0.2 
Std. Dev. 1.43  1.24   1.20  1.27   
 
 
Column 2 - The Freedom Index for 1992 and 1995 (FI1)  
Column 3 - Years in which the EU signed a PCA or EMAA with the ENP country 
Column 4 – The Freedom Index for the above year (FI 2).  
Column 5 - The difference in FI ratings between FI1 and FI2. It is a measure of the 
improvement (positive values) or deterioration (negative values) that has 
occurred between the start of the association process and the signing of the 
agreements. (D1) 
Column 6 – Year in which Agreements went into force  
Column 7 – Freedom House Index for those years (FI3) 
Column 8 - The difference in FI ratings between FI2 and FI3 (D2) 
Column 9 - The most recent Freedom House data for 2004.  
 36 
Column 10 – The difference between the current state of political rights and civil 
liberties (FI4) and the state of liberal democracy when the agreements went into 
force (FI3) (D3) 
Column 11 - The difference in FI ratings for the entire period from the start of the PCA 
and Barcelona processes until 2004.  
 
(Taken from Schimmelfennig, Frank. 2005. European Neighbourhood Policy: Political 
Conditionality and its Impact on Democracy in Non-Candidate Neighbouring Countries. 
Paper prepared for the EUSA Ninth Biennial International Conference. Austin, March 
31-April 2, 2005) 
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